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Avi-Yonah and Sartori:

INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND COMPETITIVENESS:
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 and Nicola Sartori2

1. Introduction

In February, 2012, the Treasury and White House unveiled President Obama’s
Framework for Business Tax Reform. A major proposal included in this
Framework was to abolish the deferral on income earned by foreign subsidiaries
of US corporations (“CFCs”). This proposal was justified as follows:

income earned by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations operating abroad
must be subject to a minimum rate of tax. This would stop our tax
system from generously rewarding companies for moving profits
offshore. Thus, foreign income deferred in a low- tax jurisdiction would
be subject to immediate U.S. taxation up to the minimum tax rate with a
foreign tax credit allowed for income taxes on that income paid to the
host country. This minimum tax would be designed to balance the need
to stop rewarding tax havens and to prevent a race to the bottom with
the goal of keeping U.S. companies on a level playing field with
competitors when engaged in activities which, by necessity, must occur
in a foreign country.3

Thus, even the Obama proposal took into account competitiveness in designing
international tax reform. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, Chairman
David Camp of the House Ways and Means Committee unveiled a proposal to
almost completely exempt active income of CFCs, even when distributed to their
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parents as a dividend. This proposal was mostly justified by competitiveness
considerations.4

The debate about whether to abolish deferral or to adopt territoriality has been
going on ever since the Kennedy Administration first proposed ending deferral in
1961. The problem is that neither side has factual support for their argument about
whether the U.S. tax system, including Subpart F, as currently enacted or with any
of the proposed reforms, in fact negatively impacts the tax burden of US-based
MNEs. Even the concept of competitiveness itself is unclear. Despite numerous
claims, there has been no rigorous attempt that we are aware of to determine
whether MNEs based in our major trading partners in fact have a tax advantage or
disadvantage because of Subpart F or other rules.

In October, 2011, the American Tax Policy Institute sponsored a conference
organized by Reuven Avi-Yonah and Jane Gravelle on “International Taxation
and Competitiveness”. This conference was designed to address these issues in a
systematic way, and to form the basis for a better informed policy debate going
forward.

The articles included in this volume were first presented at this

conference. What follows is an attempt to summarize their main conclusions.

2. The concept of competitiveness.

Before analyzing the liaison between competitiveness and international taxation, it
is necessary to delineate the concept(s) of competitiveness, which is a rarely
defined but frequently used term (especially in tax policy debates).
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Economists use a macroeconomic concept of competitiveness, in order to make
comparisons across nations, while they use a microeconomic concept of
competitiveness in order to make comparisons among businesses and workers
operating in different markets. On this regard, Michael S. Knoll specifies that
“For purposes of understanding how government policy affects competitiveness,
microeconomic definitions have several advantages over macroeconomic
definitions”. In fact, microeconomic definitions “are more closely aligned with
our intuitions about competitiveness” and “are capable of being given a more
solid theoretical foundation because they can be integrated into standard
economic models”.
The concept of competitiveness as a characteristic of an entire nation has been
strongly criticized by Paul Krugman5 (cited by both Michael S. Knoll and Jane G.
Gravelle), because nations, which cannot be compared with corporations, are not
competitors, since they “do not go out of business”. While firms compete,
countries trade. The U.S. can be better off or worse off (rather than competitive).
This is why the term competitiveness is very often associated to an industry rather
than a nation.
There are two main definitions of competitiveness, with regards to industries.
Under the first definition, competitiveness focuses on the total output (both
domestic and foreign) of the companies based in the U.S. An industry is
competitive in the U.S. if U.S. multinationals have a strong ability to compete
with foreign multinationals (both in domestic and foreign markets). The focus is
on the nationality of the producing company (regardless of the place of
production). Therefore, “the U.S. corporate income tax will adversely affect the
competitiveness of the U.S. … industry if it reduces the incentive for U.S.-based …
manufacturers – relative to their foreign competitors – to own productive assets”
(Michael S. Knoll).

5
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Under the second definition, competitiveness focuses on the total output of an
industry in the U.S. regardless of the nationality of the producing company. An
industry is competitive if U.S. and foreign multinationals invest in the U.S, rather
than in foreign countries. The focus is on the U.S. production (regardless of the
nationality of the producing companies). Therefore, “the U.S. corporate income
tax reduces the competitiveness of the U.S. … industry if it discourages investment
in … production in the United States relative to investment in … production
abroad” (Michael S. Knoll).
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav believe that “The competitiveness issue is
primarily about the ability of the largest US multinationals to compete with their
counterparts based in other countries, and especially those based in EU”. In other
words, they adopt the first definition of competitiveness, focused on the
ownership of productive assets.
Also Brian J. Arnold implicitly adopts the first definition of competitiveness
where he writes that “claims have been made that US multinationals are at a
significant

competitive

disadvantage

compared

to

many

foreign-based

multinationals because the US Subpart F rules are broader and harsher than the
CFC rules of other capital-exporting countries”.
As underlined by Jane G. Gravelle, the conflict between the two definitions also
emerges by the objectives of the Fiscal Commission. Reading the report by the
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, titled The Moment of
Truth, December 2010, it is not clear whether the Commission wants more U.S.
owned operations abroad or wants more foreign-owned operations in the U.S.
Finally, an operational definition of competitiveness (which resembles the second
above mentioned definition rather than the first, but is also close to a
macroeconomic notion) is adopted by Eric Toder, according to whom countries
compete with other nations for: “1) labor supply, 2) financial and physical
capital, 3) intangible capital, 4) tax revenues, and 5) natural resources”. In other
words, competitiveness, according to Eric Toder, means “competition between
nations for scarce and mobile resources”. Following this definition, taxation can
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affect the ability of countries to compete for workers, capital, and investment
opportunities.
On this regard, it is worth noting that Kimberly A. Clausing has reviewed the
effects of corporate taxation on labor, concluding that “corporate taxation may
lower wages, but the preponderance of evidence does not suggest any wage effects
from corporate taxation”. Thus, “while corporate taxation may discourage some
types of investment, it may not have a large enough effect on overall investment to
cause substantial reduction in wages”. This analysis is helpful to better
understand the effects of corporate taxation on (the second definition of)
competitiveness.

3. Competitiveness and the neutrality principles of international taxation (CEN,
CIN and CON)

Michael S. Knoll has shown that while the first definition of competitiveness
(U.S. multinationals competing with foreign multinationals) is consistent with the
advocacy of “capital ownership neutrality” (or, alternatively, “capital import
neutrality”), the second definition (U.S. competing with other countries for
providing labor and capital to multinationals) is consistent with the advocacy of
“capital export neutrality”.
On one side “the tax neutrality benchmark of CON as well as the benchmark of
CIN (when the latter is understood as ownership neutrality) are closely associated
with the first definition of competitiveness, which focuses on the ability of
companies located in different countries to acquire productive assets. A tax
system that satisfies CON is one in which companies, regardless of where they are
based, compete on an equal footing in seeking to acquire productive assets. Tax
considerations will not advantage or disadvantage any of them in their ability to
acquire productive assets” (Michael S. Knoll).
On the other side, “the tax neutrality benchmark of CEN is closely associated with
the second definition of competitiveness, which focuses on a state’s ability to
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attract foreign investment. An international tax regime that satisfies CEN (i.e.,
universal adoption of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits) will
place all states on an equal footing in their ability to attract foreign investment.
Tax consideration will not advantage or disadvantage any of them in their ability
to attract investment” (Michael S. Knoll).
As it is known, the neutrality concepts are strictly connected with the tax
treatment of cross border income.
On this regard, Jane G. Gravelle reminds that:
- “in territorial or source-based tax systems, income is taxed only by the country
in which it is earned. It meets the standards of capital import neutrality in that
each firm in a location faces the same tax rate…”.
- “In residence systems, income is taxed only in the country of its nationality, so
that U.S. firms’ income would be taxed in the United States regardless of where
the income is earned, and the United States would not tax income earned in its
borders by foreigners…”. Residence systems “will therefore satisfy the
requirements of capital export neutrality….”
- A worldwide system, which imposes taxes on both residents (on their worldwide
income, with an unlimited foreign tax credit) and foreigners (on their source
income), would also achieve capital export neutrality, even though “the
distribution of taxes is different, with more tax collected by net capital importers
than in a straightforward residence system.”
- Finally, a worldwide system, which imposes taxes on both residents (on their
worldwide income, with a deduction for foreign taxes paid) and foreigners (on
their source income), “maximizes a country’s welfare because the rate of return
received by the country (either in its firms profits or in its own taxes) is equal”.

4. The State of the art: empirical data on the competitiveness of U.S.
multinationals.
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Adopting the most common definition of competitiveness (at least among the
panelists), tax law rules affect competitiveness in the sense that they affect the
ability of U.S. multinationals to compete for investments and for people.
As a starting point, some panelists have investigated whether U.S. multinationals,
as a matter of fact, are in a competitive disadvantage compared with foreign
(mainly European and Japanese) multinationals. This analysis has been conducted
to explore whether the competitiveness arguments that U.S. multinationals raise
with regards to U.S. corporate tax law are true. The analysis concerns effective tax
rates and takes into account CFC legislations.
According to Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav, “US-based multinationals do
not face a tax induced competitive disadvantage in competing against EU-based
multinationals”. In fact, “Even though the US statutory rate is ten percentage
points higher than the average corporate statutory rate in the EU, the effective US
corporate tax rate is the same or lower than the effective EU corporate tax rate
for largest US and EU multinationals.” This is because European corporate tax
base is larger than U.S. corporate tax base, due, for example, to tougher CFC
rules. In fact, “a comparison of the CFC rules of the US … and the major EU
jurisdictions … indicates that the EU CFC rules tend to be tougher than Subpart
F because (a) they take into account the effective tax rate in the source country in
deciding whether to tax income from a CFC, and (b) they take into account
whether the CFC has a real presence in the source country”.
This evidence is confirmed by Melissa Costa and Jennifer Gravelle analysis,
where they conclude that “Even though a significant amount of foreign income is
subject to the U.S. tax, the ability to defer taxes on foreign income and low
average foreign rates on CFC income suggests the U.S. tax systems has strong
territorial aspects, with a nominal residual average tax on foreign earnings”.
Therefore, “U.S. corporations are likely not being negatively impacted by the U.S.
corporate tax rate”.
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Brian J. Arnold, summarizing a few other papers presented at the conference,
compares CFC legislations of nine different countries6, and concludes that “the
US Subpart F rules are not noticeably broader than the CFC rules of other
countries, with the exception perhaps of the slightly broader concept of base
company income under the US rules”. The comparative analysis of CFC rules
confirms the outcomes of Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav research.
In conclusion, it seems that, as a matter of fact, the argument that U.S. corporate
tax rules make U.S. multinationals less competitive in foreign markets compared
with European and Japanese multinationals is generally wrong.

5. Residence vs. worldwide based taxation: competitiveness issue

Depending on the definition of competitiveness adopted, it is possible to argue in
favor of territorial or worldwide taxation principles.
The argument made by some scholars that the U.S. tax system, based on the
worldwide taxation principle, should move to territoriality, in order to enforce the
ability of U.S. corporations to compete abroad, has been investigated by some
panelists.
On this regard, Eric Toder believes that a tax reform that adopts a territorial
system (lowering the corporate tax rate and broadening the tax base at the same
time) “will improve the competitiveness of U.S. multinational corporations” (first
definition of competitiveness), but will raise “the cost of investing in the United
States” (second definition of competitiveness). In other words, territoriality helps
U.S. multinationals to compete with foreign multinationals, but concomitantly has
a negative impact on the capability of U.S. to attract investments.
On the other hand, a tax policy that eliminates deferral (lowering the corporate tax
rate and broadening the tax base as well) “will make U.S.-based multinational
6

For a comparative analysis of CFC legislations see also R. Avi-Yonah and N. Sartori,
US Sub-part F Legislative proposals: A Comparative Perspective, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION, 2011, n. 11, 428-437.
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corporations less competitive, but reduce the cost of investing in the United
States”. In other words, pure residence taxation would increase the ability of the
U.S. to attract investments, but would reduce the ability of U.S. multinationals to
compete with foreign multinationals.
The variety of modified territorial, modified worldwide or mixed territorial and
worldwide systems are analyzed by Jane G. Gravelle in terms of competitiveness.
A comparative analysis underlines that “a territorial tax, a tax system generally
aimed at the international competitiveness objective, is more commonly used
around the world, although there are restrictions imposed by most countries. As
well, the United States, the only major country to currently use a worldwide tax,
has deferral provisions that may move it closer to a territorial tax”.
According to Jane G. Gravelle (who adopts the first definition of
competitiveness), territorial taxation is inefficient because “it causes the relative
after tax returns to be higher in the lower-tax country and thus encourages capital
flow into the low tax jurisdictions. As that occurs, the pre-tax return will rise in
the high tax country as capital is less abundant, will fall in the zero tax country
and capital because more abundant, and could either rise or fall in the low tax
country. The shift in capital will occur until after tax returns are equated in all
jurisdictions… . Countries’ firms still compete in every location but the capitallabor ratios are distorted and the outcome is inefficient”.
Moreover, in her opinion, competitiveness, and therefore territoriality, would
undermine Subpart F and would greatly enable profit shifting from high tax
jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions for mere tax reasons.

6. Reduction of corporate tax rates, tax cuts and other possible reforms.

As noted by Bret Wells and Cym Lowell, “any reform proposal that creates a tax
handicap for US MNEs poses the risk of contributing to the trend of US MNEs
being acquired by foreign MNEs or expatriating, actually or practically, because
of the tax advantages afforded to foreign ownership”.
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For these reasons, any reform proposals must take into account competitiveness
issues.
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav, for example, conclude that the “US can in
fact reduce its corporate tax rate to the EU average in a revenue neutral fashion
without affecting the competitiveness of US-based multinationals… . Specifically,
as many observers have recommended, it should be possible to abolish deferral
altogether if the US rate were reduced sufficiently”. Alternatively, “it should be
possible to amend Subpart F to take the source country rate into account”.
Eric Toder analyzes the most important effects on competitiveness7 of various tax
cuts. His main conclusions are the following:
- “cuts in marginal personal income tax rates have the most direct effect on
increasing competitiveness for skilled and internationally mobile workers.
- “Cuts in taxes on capital gains and dividends and in estate taxes are the tax
policy changes that have the most direct effect on the choice residence of wealthy
individuals”.
- “Cuts in the effective marginal tax rate on new corporate investments are the
cuts that have the most direct effect on capital invested in the United States”.
- Cuts in the taxation of foreign-source income of U.S. multinationals directly
reduce investment in the United States by giving these companies an incentive to
invest more overseas ..., however proved benefit for U.S. – resident corporations,
reducing their tax burden relative to taxes imposed on profits of corporations that
are resident in other countries”.
However, as Bret Wells and Cym Lowell exposed, any tax reforms, other than
competitiveness, should achieve “the fundamental Policy Objectives: (i) Fiscal
Responsibility via the raising of revenue; (ii) Neutrality, including addressing the
Homeless Income arising from US origin profits and Base Erosion problems and,
as a result, the perceived “tax gap;” (iii) Consistency with US treaty obligations;
and (iv) Administrability”. In order to meet the “Policy Objectives”, their proposal

7

As seen, Eric Toder adopts a functional definition of competitiveness, which is partially
different than the one adopted by other panelists.
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is that “domestic transfer pricing principles should be revised to require that
cross-border payments from a US payor to a foreign entity should be subject to a
base protecting surtax (the “Base Protecting Surtax”), unless the US payor
reaches agreement with the Internal Revenue Service … that a lower or no Base
Protecting Surtax is required after evaluating the global income of the foreign
entity and the US payor in light of the overall business and the functions and risks
performed in the United States by the US payor (a “Base Clearance Certificate”).
Any tax reforms should also take into account the fact, shown by Kevin S. Markle
and Douglas A. Shackelford, that multinationals lower their domestic corporate
tax bases by issuing long-term debt, relying on intangibles, and establishing
subsidiaries in tax havens. Their conclusion is that “compared with firms from
abroad, U.S. companies appear to favor debt more than other countries to avoid
taxes but do not exploit intangibles and havens as much”.

7. Conclusion

In summary, the major conclusions of the articles in this volume are as follows:

1. The concept of competitiveness is unclear and there are open questions
regarding its usefulness as a metric for determining US international tax
policy.
2. There is no good empirical evidence supporting the view that current US
tax law adversely affects the competitiveness of US-based MNEs.
3. The CFC rules of our major trading partners are not significantly less
onerous than Subpart F.

In our opinion, this means that competitiveness should not be a major
consideration

in

reforming

US

international

tax

policy.

Other

considerations, such as the various neutralities (CEN, CIN, CON) and the
impact of tax rules on actual behavior by US-based MNEs (e.g., the
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decision whether to repatriate income) and on whether future MNEs will
be based in the US are more important.
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